‘Regular’ choice and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference

We explore the relation between two ‘rationality conditions’ for stochastic choice behavior: regularity and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference (WASRP). We show that WASRP implies regularity, but the converse is not true. We identify a restriction on the domain of the stochastic choice function, which suffices for regularity to imply WASRP. When the universal set of alternatives is finite, this restriction is also necessary for regularity to imply WASRP. Furthermore, we identify necessary and sufficient domain restrictions for regularity to imply WASRP, when the universal set of alternatives is finite and stochastic choice functions are all degenerate. Results in the traditional, deterministic, framework regarding the relation between Chernoff’s condition and the weak axiom of revealed preference follow as special cases. Thus, general conditions are established, under which regularity can substitute for WASRP as the axiomatic foundation for a theory of choice behavior.     

Optimal Allocation for Comparing <Emphasis Type="Italic">k</Emphasis> Test Treatments to Positive and Negative Control with Unequal Weighting Under A-optimality and MV-optimality

Experiments in real life often involve comparisons of test treatments to more than one control. However, the controls may not always be of equal importance. In this paper we introduce weighted MV optimality criterion and present a detailed study using both weighted A and MV optimality criteria, of the problem of optimally comparing a set of test treatments to two controls (positive and a negative) that are of unequal importance to the experimenter.     

Designing an optimal contest

The paper brings a mechanism design perspective to the study of contests. We consider the problem of selecting a contest success function when the contest designer may also value the prize. We show that any equilibrium outcome that can be achieved by a concave increasing contest success function can be replicated by a linear contest success function. An expected utility maximizing designer should employ a linear homogeneous contest success function. We explicitly derive the optimal contest for a risk-neutral designer and present comparative statics results. Tullock's contest is optimal only when the designer's valuation for the prize is low.     

Community and class antagonism

We investigate how vertical unity within a community interacts with horizontal class divisions of an unequal income distribution. Community is conceptualized in terms of a public good to which all those in the community have equal access, but from which outsiders are excluded. We formulate the idea of redistributive tension, or class antagonism, in terms of the costs that poorer individuals would be willing to impose on the rich, to achieve a given gain in personal income. Our conclusion is that the nominal distribution of income could give a misleading picture of tensions in society, both within and across communities. Ideologies of community solidarity may well trump those of class solidarity because of the implicit sharing of community resources brought about by community-specific public goods. Greater economic mobility of particular types may actually exacerbate class tensions instead of attenuating them. We illustrate our theoretical results with a discussion of a number of historical episodes of shifting class tensions and alliances.     

Tender Offers, Proxy Contests, and Large-Shareholder Activism

The paper analyzes tender offers and proxy contests as alternative means of resolving corporate governance conflicts between dissidents and incumbent management. We show that when a dissident shareholder is sufficiently confident about the potential benefits from changing corporate policy, he will seek majority control by making a tender offer rather than initiating a proxy contest. When the dissident is relatively uninformed, however, he may opt for a proxy contest, thereby utilizing the information of other shareholders to implement the better policy. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that announcements of tender offers will tend to be associated with larger positive stockprice reactions than announcements of proxy contests. The model is easily extended to allow for promanagement bias in proxy voting by institutional investors. Empirical observations that have been viewed as evidence of such promanagement bias are shown to be quite consistent with the absence of such bias. Policy issues are discussed as well. An interesting result is that even policies targeted at reducing the costs of conducting proxy contests may have ambiguous social consequences, given the possibility of substitution between tender offers and proxy contests.     

Regionality revisited: An examination of the direction of spread of currency crises

What determines the direction of spread of currency crises? We examine data on waves of currency crises in 1992, 1994, 1997, and 1998 to evaluate several hypotheses on the determinants of contagion. We simultaneously consider trade competition, financial links, and institutional similarity to the “ground zero” country as potential drivers of contagion. To overcome data limitations and account for model uncertainty, we utilize Bayesian methodologies hitherto unused in the empirical literature on contagion. In particular, we use the Bayesian averaging of binary models that allows us to take into account the uncertainty regarding the appropriate set of regressors.We find that institutional similarity to the ground zero country plays an important role in determining the direction of contagion in all the emerging market currency crises in our dataset. We thus provide persuasive evidence in favour of the “wake-up call” hypothesis for financial contagion. Trade and financial links may also play a role in determining the direction of contagion, but their importance varies amongst the crisis periods.     

SEARCH BEHAVIOR OF ASYMMETRICALLY INFORMED VOTERS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*

This paper experimentally investigates individual level search within a spatial election model. In our model the voter is required to cast a ballot for one of two candidates. However, the voter's task is made non-trivial since, even though the location of one candidate is known, the location of a second candidate is unknown. To reduce uncertainty regarding the unknown candidate's location, the voter may undertake an information search. We find that search in this environment is a function of the cost of search, the quality of information, and the voter's location on the issue space.     

Dynamic coordination with individual learning

We study coordination in dynamic global games with private learning. Players choose whether and when to invest irreversibly in a project whose success depends on its quality and the timing of investment. Players gradually learn about project quality. We identify conditions on temporal incentives under which, in sufficiently long games, players coordinate on investing whenever doing so is not dominated. Roughly speaking, this outcome occurs whenever players? payoffs are sufficiently tolerant of non-simultaneous coordination. We also identify conditions under which players coordinate on the risk-dominant action. We provide foundations for these results in terms of higher order beliefs.     

The daughter effect: do CEOs with daughters hire more women to their board?

Using a sample of S&P 100 firms, we find that CEOs with a daughter are more likely to hire new women to their board of directors than CEOs without a daughter. Our results provide additional evidence that parents’ attitudes and actions are affected by the gender of their children and that the effect is strong enough to influence important decisions at large corporations.